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Abstract 
In this paper I theorize the roles of effective demand and Say’s law in the Marxist theory of 
exploitation and accumulation. I claim that an exogenous rate of exploitation, or an 
exogenous functional distribution of income between profits and wages, implies deploying 
Say’s law, which leads profit rates not to equalize across sectors. Marx’s own procedure in 
Capital III of simultaneously supposing an exogenous rate of exploitation and profit rate 
equalization was therefore logically inconsistent. Once Keynes’ principle of effective demand 
is introduced, the rate of exploitation and hence the distribution of income between wages 
and profits become endogenous to aggregate demand. Profit rates then do equalize across 
sectors and prices of production can function as gravitational centers for market prices in a 
competitive economy. If we aim at developing a theory that is both empirically relevant and 
logically consistent, Marxist scholars must therefore drop Say’s law and incorporate Keynes’ 
principle of effective demand for a proper understanding of how capital accumulation 
determines the rate of exploitation, the functional distribution of income, and the equalization 
of profit rates. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to theorize the roles of effective demand and Say’s law in the Marxist 
theory of exploitation and accumulation. I argue that an exogenous rate of exploitation, or an exogenous 
functional distribution of income between profits and wages, implies deploying Say’s law, which leads 
profit rates not to equalize across sectors. Marx’s own procedure in Capital III of simultaneously 
supposing an exogenous rate of exploitation and profit rate equalization was therefore logically 
inconsistent. Once Keynes’ principle of effective demand is introduced, the rate of exploitation and hence 
the distribution of income between wages and profits become endogenous to aggregate demand. Profit 
rates then do equalize across sectors and prices of production can function as gravitational centers for 
market prices in a competitive economy.  
Marxist scholars must therefore drop Say’s law once and for all and incorporate Keynes’ 
principle of effective demand for a proper understanding of how capital accumulation determines the rate 
of exploitation, the functional distribution of income, and the equalization of profit rates. 
Marx himself was ambiguous in his original writings regarding the role of effective demand. In 
the three volumes of Capital, in the Grundrisse, and in the Theories of Surplus Value, Marx repeatedly 
referred to realization problems and to the fact that produced values have no guarantee to be fully 
validated in the market. Marx even located the potential lack of demand to validate produced values in the 
function of money as a means of hoarding, of money as an end in itself. The Marxist literature then 
developed its own branch of inquiry into realization problems and realization crises. Marx, on the 
contrary, also often assumed Say’s law. In the third volume of Capital Marx introduced his reproduction 
scheme and offered novel ideas on profit rate equalization and falling profitability amid technological 
progress. But in his reproduction model, Say’s law is deployed and realization problems play no part in 
the theory of accumulation and exploitation. 
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Because of Marx’s death in 1883, his drafts of the second and third volumes of Capital were left 
unfinished. Engels later edited and published the manuscripts in the 1890s but the connections between 
effective demand, exploitation, and accumulation were left incomplete. Since the advent of Keynesian 
and Kaleckian macroeconomics in the the 1930s, Marxists have attempted to offer new insights into how 
the theory of effective demand would relate to Marx’s theory of capital accumulation. The influential 
works of Sweezy ([1942]1970) and Baran and Sweezy (1968), for example, have had a major impact in 
the Political Economy literature for they represented serious attempts to integrate the principle of 
effective demand into the Marxist framework. Dutt (2011), however, recently argued that the role of 
effective demand in Marxist theory is yet underdeveloped. Dutt claimed that Marxists still struggle to 
provide a consistent theory of how effective demand would affect capital accumulation both in the short 
and long runs. 
In this paper I offer new insights into the Marxist theory of accumulation and exploitation 
regarding the roles of Say’s law and Keynes’ principle of effective demand. Marx’s procedure in the third 
volume of Capital of assuming simultaneously an exogenous rate of exploitation and profit rate 
equalization was mistaken. With an exogenous rate of exploitation, whatever its level is, we might obtain 
equal profit rates across sectors but, if so, only by fluke and only temporarily. Equal profit rates, however, 
do not imply profit rate equalization. Profit rate equalization requires profit rates to be equal across 
sectors and also requires this equality to be self-correcting (i.e. to have asymptotic stability). Even if profit 
rates are now and then equal, if the equality is not self-correcting we cannot accurately call it profit rate 
equalization. 
Marx's assumption of an exogenous rate of exploitation implicitly depends on Say's law because 
the rate of exploitation can be exogenous only if all values produced are always realized. But if Say's law 
holds, then there is no self-correction mechanism that would equalize profit rates across sectors. Say’s 
law, or an exogenous rate of exploitation, imply that all values (hence all surplus value and profits) 
produced must be realized, and thus it pre-determines profitability in such a way that profit rates are 
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unresponsive to the amount invested in each sector. Under an exogenous rate of exploitation or under 
Say’s law the prices of production, the prices that correspond to equalized profit rates, no longer function 
as gravity centers for market prices. Because it predetermines the amount of profits to be realized, an 
exogenous rate of exploitation further implies that the profit-wage ratio and hence the functional 
distribution of income between wages and profits are also exogenous and thus unresponsive to the 
accumulation of capital.  
If, however, Say's law does not hold then the rate of exploitation becomes endogenous and 
dependent on effective demand, and profit rates do equalize across sectors. When effective demand is 
taken into account the rate of exploitation will automatically become dependent upon it, profit rates will 
equalize across sectors, and this equalization will be self-correcting (i.e. will be stable asymptotically). 
Effective demand allows for profit rate equalization in a competitive economy because sector profitability 
then responds negatively to the amount of investment in each sector. Over-investment in one sector will 
erode profits in that sector and capital will then gradually move to other sectors. Because the rate of 
exploitation becomes endogenous to effective demand, the profit-wage ratio and hence the distribution of 
income between wages and profits also become endogenous to the level of aggregate expenditures. 
Profit rates equalize, and hence prices of production can operate as gravitational centers for 
market prices, only when the rate of exploitation and the functional distribution of income are dependent 
upon the level of effective demand. When the rate of exploitation is exogenous, or when the distribution 
of income between profits and wages is taken as given, Say’s law prevents profit rate equalization and 
hence prevents prices of production from operating as gravitational centers for market prices in a 
competitive environment.  
In order to develop my arguments I introduce an evolutionary model of exploitation, 
accumulation, and technological progress that closely mimics Marx’s original insights. I use this model to 
demonstrate the implications of Keynes’ effective demand and Say’s law on the accumulation of capital, 
exploitation, the distribution of income between wages and profits, and the equalization of profit rates. 
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The Marxist theory of capital accumulation is certainly one of an evolutionary and adaptive economy. 
Marx in his own time, unfortunately, had no access to the mathematics and computer simulations of 
evolutionary systems that we have today. These new tools allow us to develop Marx's theory in ways that 
were not available to him in the nineteenth century. 
My Marxist model of capital accumulation draws on previous contributions. From Foley (2003) 
and Bowles (2006) I take the notion that in classical Political Economy economic growth takes place in 
an evolutionary system that is most often not in equilibrium. From Duménil and Lévy (2011; 1995) I take 
the idea of technical change as a stochastic process. Capitalists adopt randomly created techniques if and 
only if they increase individual profitability. From Prado (2006) I take the idea of formulating Marx’s 
contribution in Capital III along the lines of an evolutionary system. Prado’s (2006) contribution is 
interesting for proposing a simple way of modeling many of Marx’s insights by employing replicator 
equations at the macro level. In Prado (2002) he also used a system of replication to approach Duménil 
and Lévy’s classical evolutionary model of technical change at the micro level. Duménil and Lévy (2011; 
1995) and Prado (2006; 2002), however, have not presented an integrated model that incorporates all 
these insights dynamically and at both the micro and macro levels simultaneously. From Dutt (2011) I 
then take the challenge of presenting a Marxist growth model in which the roles of effective demand and 
Say’s law are explicitly contrasted.  
In the sections that follow I firstly formalize the macro inter-sector competition through which the 
aggregate and growing monetary capital of an economy is continuously redistributed between two 
sectors: sector I producing means of production and sector II producing final consumption goods, such 
that commodities are produced by means of commodities. The continuous redirecting of investment 
between sectors takes place according to average profit rate differentials. Secondly, I formalize the micro 
intra-sector competition in which individual firms within each sector compete against each other via cost-
reducing technical change. Innovations are gradually adopted based on profit rate differentials within 
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sectors. Competitive selection occurs simultaneously at the micro intra-sector and at the macro inter-
sector levels.  
To describe both inter- and intra-sector forms of competition I employ replicator dynamics from 
evolutionary game theory. The replicator equation describes an updating process with random interactions 
in which behaviors with higher payoffs proliferate. It is a useful device to mimic the competitive struggle 
for survival in natural and social environments, for it models the process of equilibration by tracking the 
results of individual interactions. Chronological, not merely logical time is explicitly incorporated. The 
proposed evolutionary model formalizes key aspects of Marx’s theory of accumulation and profitability in 
an adaptive system in which agents control their actions but not the aggregate consequences of their 
individual decisions. Micro decisions produce macro outcomes that then feed back again into micro 
decisions. 
I provide two different closures for the model. In the first closure I use an exogenous rate of 
exploitation, or an exogenous functional distribution of income, that amounts to deploying Say’s law. In 
the second closure I introduce effective demand and make the rate of exploitation and the distribution of 
income dependent upon it. For both closures I present computer simulations and an analysis of the 
evolutionary stability of the different long-run equilibria. The crucial result is that the Marxist scholarship 
must abandon Say’s law and incorporate Keynes’ principle of effective demand if it aims at a more 
relevant and logically consistent theory of exploitation and capital accumulation. 
2. The Macro Inter-Sector Competition 
The economy-wide circuit of monetary capital, which starts and ends with capital in the form of 
money, can be represented through the following aggregation: 
 𝑀𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 {
𝐿𝑃
𝑀𝑃
… 𝑃 … 𝐶𝑡
′ − 𝑀𝑡
′ (1) 
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In the investment phase an initial amount of money 𝑀𝑡 purchases two types of commodities as 
inputs, 𝐶𝑡: labor power (LP) and means of production (MP).  During the subsequent production phase 
(… 𝑃 …) labor power creates more value than its own. The difference between the value that labor power 
creates and the value of labor power itself is the surplus value. The total value of the gross output 𝐶𝑡
′ 
contains the new value added that productive workers create plus the pre-existing value transferred from 
the usage of the means of production. Embodying both the value of the productive inputs and the surplus 
value, the gross output exchanges for a sum of money represented by the aggregate gross expenditures or 
gross aggregate demand 𝑀𝑡
′. Time subscripts indicate that investment, production, and sales are temporal 
events. The extra value that workers create and for which they receive no equivalent is the basis for the 
gross profits ∆𝑀𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡
′ − 𝑀𝑡 in the system. Since production does not automatically generate profits, the 
surplus value created in the productive sphere still needs to be realized in the circulation sphere subject to 
all sorts of price movements. 
The economy comprises two sectors, each producing a single type of output. Sector I employs 
labor power and means of production to deliver new supplies of a homogenous type of means of 
production. Sector II employs labor power and means of production to deliver new supplies of a 
homogenous type of final consumption good. This division of the economy into a final goods sector and a 
means of production sector, and hence that commodities are produced by means of commodities, is a core 
feature of Marxist, Kaleckian, and Sraffian models. Because economic events take place temporally, the 
overlap of any two consecutive circuits of the total monetary capital can be represented as follows: 
 
            𝑀𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 {
𝐿𝑃
𝑀𝑃
… 𝑃 … 𝐶𝑡
′ −  𝑀𝑡
′ 
  𝑀𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑡+1 {
𝐿𝑃
𝑀𝑃
… 𝑃 … 𝐶′𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑡+1
′  
(2) 
The circuit at period t+1 formally repeats the circuit at period t. The crucial relation is then that 
between the total value realized in period t, 𝑀𝑡
′, and the total investment in the next period t+1, 𝑀𝑡+1. The 
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economy reproduces itself very differently depending on the relation between 𝑀𝑡
′ and 𝑀𝑡+1, for it is in 
this relation where effective demand and Say’s law have contrasting effects. Say’s law means that all 
values produced in …P… are realized in 𝑀𝑡
′ such that no realization problems occur, and potentially that 
the total value realized in 𝑀𝑡
′ can be reinvested in 𝑀𝑡+1. The Keynesian principle of effective demand, on 
the contrary, means that 𝑀𝑡
′ = 𝑀𝑡+1 and that the direction of causality runs from expenditures in 𝑀𝑡+1 to 
incomes in 𝑀𝑡
′ : total demand for consumption at the end of period t and investment at the beginning of 
period t+1 jointly determine the total value realized at the end of period t. Say’s law and Keynes’ 
effective demand therefore imply very different behaviors for the reproduction of the total monetary 
capital over time. 
There is no fixed capital in this economy, implying that all non-labor inputs are circulating capital 
and that the means of production that enter as inputs in sectors I and II in period t are the previous output 
of sector I in period t-1. Technology is represented by a linear production structure with fixed coefficients 
and constant returns to scale. Using 𝑎𝑗𝑖 to indicate the quantity of input 𝑗 per unit of output 𝑖, the matrix of 
input-output coefficients is: 
 𝐴 = [𝑎𝑗𝑖] =  [
𝑎11 𝑎12
0 0
]       with    0 ≤ 𝑎𝑗𝑖 < 1  (3) 
Using 𝑙𝑖 to indicate the quantity of labor hours per unit of output in sector 𝑖, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 to indicate the 
within-sector profit rate per unit of output, 𝑝𝑖 to indicate the market price per unit of output, and 𝑤 to 
indicate the given money wage per work hour (determined exogenously via bargaining between workers 
and capitalists), then per unit of output we have that [𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1𝑎𝑗𝑖 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖](1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑝𝑡,𝑖 . For each sector 
the price system is: 
 
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎11 + 𝑤𝑙1](1 +  𝑟1,𝑡) = 𝑝1,𝑡 
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎12 + 𝑤𝑙2](1 + 𝑟2,𝑡) = 𝑝2,𝑡 
(4) 
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The first term inside brackets on the left hand side represents constant capital and the second term 
represents variable capital (or the value of labor power), both in money terms and both comprising the 
total circulating capital given the assumption of no fixed inputs in this model. Their summation 
[𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1𝑎𝑗𝑖 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖] is the unit cost. The material content of the means of production that constitute constant 
capital is produced and priced at the market prices prevailing at the immediate previous period. 
Competition within each sector then simultaneously determines profit rates and prices. The profit per unit 
of output is the unit cost times the profit rate: [𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖]𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖,𝑡.  
Even though the nominal wage per work hour 𝑤 is exogenously given by the bargaining power 
between workers and capitalists, the real wage 
𝑤
𝑝2,𝑡
 in terms of quantities of the consumption good 
produced in sector II is determined endogenously in this model. Labor supply is assumed not to be a 
binding constraint on growth. 
At every time period 𝑡 the total monetary capital 𝑀𝑡 in the economy must be invested between 
the two sectors. In each sector there is a collection of several firms and each of them can switch between 
sectors depending on the expected average profitability 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ . The term ‘expected’ has to be emphasized 
since once firms flow into a sector aiming at the prevailing 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅  they will immediately and unintentionally 
alter this average profitability. Capital and labor are perfectly mobile. The two shares of total monetary 
capital are 𝑓1,𝑡 representing the fraction at time 𝑡 invested in the sector producing means of production, 
and 𝑓2,𝑡 representing the fraction at time 𝑡 invested in the sector producing final goods. Hence: 
 𝑀𝑡 = 𝑓1,𝑡𝑀𝑡 +  𝑓2,𝑡𝑀𝑡 = 𝑀1,𝑡 + 𝑀2,𝑡     with      𝑓1,𝑡 +  𝑓2,𝑡 = 1 (5) 
Each share 𝑓𝑖,𝑡 is a function of itself in the previous period and is also a function of the average 
sector profit rates in the previous period. There is therefore an adjustment process that regulates the 
amount of monetary capital invested across sectors: 𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝐹(𝑓𝑖,𝑡  , 𝑟1,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  , 𝑟2,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ). Within each sector, the 
invested amount 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 then purchases labor power and means of production as in equations (1) and (2). 
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Outputs 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 , or total quantities supplied by each sector are simply sector investments divided by the 
respective unit costs: 
 𝑥𝑖,𝑡  =  
𝑓𝑖,𝑡𝑀𝑡
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖]
 =  
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖]
 (6) 
Within each sector, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′  indicates the end-of-circuit expenditures or the valorized monetary 
capitals that comprise the original monetary capitals invested 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 plus the surplus value that workers 
create. Market prices 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 in each sector are simply expenditures divided by quantities supplied in that 
sector: 
 𝑝𝑖,𝑡  =  
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑀𝑖,𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ )
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
 (7) 
We must now determine how capitalists decide to invest in either sector. Supposing a very large 
collection of firms in the economy, we can normalize the total number of firms to unity and then care only 
about the evolution of population shares. The set of shares (𝑓1,𝑡, 𝑓2,𝑡)  of the total monetary capital 
invested in each sector constitutes the set of strategies of the macro inter-sector game. Since the set 
(𝑓1,𝑡, 𝑓2,𝑡) depends explicitly on how the system evolves over time, we must derive the dynamic equation 
describing the evolution of this set of strategies.  
The decision to invest either in sector I producing means of production or in sector II producing 
final consumption goods is taken based on a comparison of expected profitability. Capitalists will invest 
in the sector in which they expect to profit the most. After investing and thus formally entering into one of 
the two sectors they will then compete for a share of the mass of profits within the chosen sector. 
The monetary capital 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 invested in sector 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is valorized on average to (1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ ) after 
the output is sold. The fraction (1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ ) is the sector valorization factor and it includes the replication of 
the money invested plus average profits. Thus the valorized capital in each sector is 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ =  𝑀𝑖,𝑡  (1 +
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𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ )  =  𝑓𝑖,𝑡  𝑀𝑡 (1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ ). Using (1 + 𝑟?̃?) to indicate the economy-wide weighted average valorization 
factor such that (1 +  𝑟?̃?) = ∑ 𝑓𝑖,𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ ) 𝑖 at any time t, the aggregate valorized capital for the entire 
economy then becomes: 
 𝑀𝑡
′ =  𝑀𝑡  (1 +  𝑟?̃?) = ∑ 𝑀𝑖,𝑡  (1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ ) 
𝑖
=  ∑ 𝑓𝑖,𝑡  𝑀𝑡 (1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ ) 
𝑖
 (8) 
The economy-wide weighted average profit rate 𝑟?̃? is a linear combination of the average profit 
rates 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅  in each sector. Corresponding weights are given by the time-sensitive shares 𝑓𝑖,𝑡 representing the 
division of the total monetary capital in the economy. The shares of the total monetary capital invested in 
the following period 𝑡 + 1 will then change according to the average profitability obtained in the current 
period 𝑡 in each sector: 
 𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 =  
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′
𝑀𝑡
′ =  
𝑓𝑖,𝑡  𝑀𝑡 (1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ ) 
𝑀𝑡 (1 +  𝑟?̃?)
=  𝑓𝑖,𝑡  
(1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ ) 
(1 +  𝑟?̃?)
 (9) 
Rewriting it as  
𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑓𝑖,𝑡
=
(1+𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
(1+ 𝑟?̃?)
 , subtracting 1 from both sides and using  Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1  = 𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 −  𝑓𝑖,𝑡 , 
we then obtain the replicator equation that formalizes the macro competition between capitalists across 
sectors: 
 Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑓𝑖,𝑡  (
1
1 + 𝑟?̃?
) [𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ − 𝑟?̃?] (10) 
Using carets to denote growth rates and indicating the rate of growth of each sector investment 
share as 𝑓𝑖,𝑡 ̂ we arrive at 𝑓𝑖,?̂? =
𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑟?̃?
1+𝑟?̃?
. If the average profit rate 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅  in a sector is greater than the economy-
wide average profit rate 𝑟?̃? then more firms will flow into the more profitable sector, raising the share of 
this sector’s investment in relation to the total monetary capital in the economy. If the sector average 
profit rate lies below the economy-wide average profitability then some capitalists will flow out of this 
relatively less profitable sector in order to invest their monetary capital in the other more profitable sector. 
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The profitability gap in relation to the economy-wide average thus determines the velocity of the changes 
in 𝑓𝑖,𝑡. Since there are only two sectors, one replicator equation is enough to describe the adjustment at the 
macro level. 
It is obviously not so easy and smooth for an actual capitalist to move her investments to a 
completely different type of economic activity. Most firms producing final goods cannot start producing 
means of production just due to profit rate differentials. To introduce an extra level of realism in the 
model, only a fraction 𝜇 ∈ (0,1] of the capitalists in each sector will in fact shift their monetary capital to 
a different activity that is currently benefitting from higher returns. The complementary fraction (1 − 𝜇) 
cannot update their investment behavior even when return differentials are an incentive for them to do so. 
Including this exogenous parameter 𝜇 that controls for how many firms can indeed update their behavior 
leads us to the final replicator equation for the macro flows of monetary capital: 
 Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜇 𝑓𝑖,𝑡  (
1
1 + 𝑟?̃?
) [𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ −  𝑟?̃?] (11) 
In this evolutionary model, the search for individual profits at the micro level creates 
unintentional consequences both in the average profit rates 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅  at the sector level as well as at the 
aggregate level via the economy-wide average profit rate 𝑟?̃? . Capitalists invest predicated on average 
profit rates prevailing in each sector, not based on the economy-wide profit rate, but they end up affecting 
aggregate profitability unintentionally through their decentralized individual actions. The effects on the 
aggregate profit rate then feed back into individual decisions about where to invest the monetary capital in 
the following period.  
In a decentralized market, individual actions produce unintended aggregate outcomes that then 
have feedback effects upon individual actions, and so forth. Capitalists control their actions. They do not, 
however, control the consequences of their actions. The accumulation of capital and its continuous flow 
to different sectors of the economy are not reducible to the individual deliberate decisions of capitalists, 
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even though it surely depends upon them. The macro outcome is the resulting vector of all individual 
decisions plus the complex interplay that none of the agents can anticipate. 
The equations so far presented describe the growth of output and the evolutionary adjustments 
that regulate the shares of investments over time at the macro level. In the next section I turn to the 
competition for profits through cost-reducing technical change that characterize the micro-adjustments 
within each sector. 
3. The Micro Intra-Sector Competition 
Large collections of firms compete for profits within each sector. Markets are intensely 
competitive, forcing firms to sell at prevailing market prices. The way to increase individual profits lies 
therefore with the adoption of new cost-reducing technologies. New innovations are randomly created and 
then adopted conditional on enhancing individual profitability. When an individual firm decides to adopt 
a new technology, its individual unit cost is reduced through new techniques that save on labor or on 
means of production or even on both at the same time. Competition then drives other firms in the same 
sector to gradually adopt the new technology. Each sector will thus display a production structure that is a 
combination of firms producing with the new techniques and firms still producing with the old technique.  
When an individual firm decides upon the adoption of a new productive structure it does so 
taking the prevailing market price as given. But the individual adoption of the newer technique changes 
the sector cost structure and therefore unintentionally affects the market price. The new market price then 
operates as a signal for the remaining firms to also adopt the cost-reducing technique. It is possible, 
though not guaranteed, that profit-seeking firms will end up unintentionally reducing their profitability 
over time.  
The economy has three evolutionary processes taking place concurrently. The first is the 
evolutionary diffusion of new techniques in the sector producing means of production. The second is the 
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evolutionary diffusion of new techniques in the sector producing final consumption goods. The third is 
the evolutionary distribution of the growing aggregate monetary capital between sectors. A single 
decision to simply adopt a new technique thus triggers a complex chain of reactions and feedback effects 
that no individual capitalist can anticipate. Furthermore, any intra-sector change in average profitability 
will then trigger further changes in the inter-sector flows of investment. Externalities do exist in this 
economy given that firms do not fully internalize the social consequences of their individual actions.  
Even though the innovation process is exogenous, the adoption of innovations is endogenous. 
Adoption occurs if the individual profit rate associated with the new technology is greater than the current 
profit rate associated with the existing technology. The evolution of technological diffusion can then be 
modeled employing replicator dynamics for each sector. Innovation means simply new process 
technologies, not product technologies. Innovations are hence restricted to those that affect production 
costs, not contemplating those that create new types of products. 
The prevailing technique of production is represented in the set of four technical parameters 
(𝑎11
𝑜 , 𝑎12
𝑜 , 𝑙1
𝑜, 𝑙2
𝑜). A random innovation (𝑎11
𝑛 , 𝑎12
𝑛 , 𝑙1
𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑛) can imply the use of more of both inputs, less of 
both inputs, or even more of one and less of the other input. Superscript 𝑜 indicates a technical parameter 
associated with the older technology, while superscript 𝑛 indicates a technical parameter associated with 
the newer technology. The productivity of an input rises if less of that input is required to produce the 
same amount of output. When the productivity of both factors jointly go up the new technique is surely 
adopted, and when both productivities jointly go down its adoption is rejected. If a technology requires 
more of one factor and less of another, adoption then depends on the expected profitability.  
The relationship between the old and new technical coefficients is summarized in the set (𝜂𝑎11, 
𝜂𝑎12, 𝜂l1, 𝜂l2) determining the growth rates of factor productivity, respectively: 
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 𝜂𝑎11 =  
𝑎11
𝑜 −  𝑎11
𝑛
𝑎11
𝑛        and          𝜂𝑎12 =  
𝑎12
𝑜 −  𝑎12
𝑛
𝑎12
𝑛  
𝜂l1 =  
𝑙1
𝑜 −  𝑙1
𝑛
𝑙1
𝑛            and          𝜂l2 =  
𝑙2
𝑜 −  𝑙2
𝑛
𝑙2
𝑛  
(12) 
When positive, these growth rates indicate that factor productivities are rising and hence 
production is saving on those inputs. For example, 𝜂𝑎12 = 10% implies that the production of each unit 
of the final consumption good in sector II requires 10% less of the means of production produced by 
sector I. Similarly, 𝜂𝑙1 = 5% implies that the production of each unit of the means of production in sector 
I requires 5% less of its workers’ labor time. When the growth rate is negative, factor productivity 
declines and production becomes more intensive in that input. A negative productivity growth such as 
𝜂𝑎11 = −15% implies, for example, that the production of means of production in sector I requires 15% 
more means of production per unit of output.  
Given the total amount of monetary capital to be invested and its distribution between sectors at 
the beginning of each period ( 𝑀𝑡  and 𝑓𝑖,𝑡  respectively), and given a certain productive structure 
(𝑎11
𝑜 , 𝑎12
𝑜 , 𝑙1
𝑜, 𝑙2
𝑜), we can calculate sector supplies 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 via equation (6) and then market prices 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 via 
equation (7) once we have determined sector expenditures 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ . Because firms in sector II produce and 
sell only one type of final consumption good, and because firms in sector I produce and sell only one type 
of means of production, there is only one market price prevailing within each sector at any time 𝑡. With 
the technical coefficient set ( 𝑎11
𝑜 ,  𝑎12
𝑜 ,  𝑙1
𝑜 ,  𝑙2
𝑜 ) given and with an exogenous money wage 𝑤 , the 
determination of market prices allows for the subsequent determination of profit rates per unit of output in 
each sector using the fact that [𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑜 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜](1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡) =  𝑝𝑖,𝑡. Rearranging it yields the equation for 
the profit rate per unit produced using current technology, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 : 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 =
𝑝𝑖,𝑡
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑜 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜]
− 1 (13) 
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After the random creation of a new technique (𝑎11
𝑛 , 𝑎12
𝑛 , 𝑙1
𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑛), capitalists will adopt it if doing so 
increases their individual profits at the current money wage and prevailing market prices. The profit rate 
associated with the new technology is 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 :  
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 =
𝑝𝑖,𝑡
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛]
− 1 (14) 
Firms calculate the expected profit rate 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛  associated with the new technology based on a given 
money wage and current market prices because the individual firm cannot anticipate how the 
uncoordinated adoption of the new technique will affect market prices. As long as 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 > 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜  firms will 
keep adopting the new technology.  
The evolutionary diffusion of a new technique (𝑎11
𝑛 , 𝑎12
𝑛 , 𝑙1
𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑛) can then be formalized with the 
dynamics of replication. The variable 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 ∈ [0,1] indicates the share of firms in sector 𝑖 that adopt the 
new technique at time 𝑡, while (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 ) indicates the share that does not update and remains with the 
older technique. Because each sector has a large collection of firms and supposing that they interact 
through random pairwise matching, we can use a simple replicator equation for the diffusion of 
innovations. Normalizing population sizes to unity allows us to work with population shares in each 
sector as follows: 
 
𝜐𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡(1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 −  𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 ] 
∆𝜐𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜐𝑖,𝑡(1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 −  𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 ] 
∆𝜐𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜐𝑖,𝑡[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 −  𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ ] 
(15) 
The term 𝜐𝑖,𝑡(1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡) is the variance of the firms within each sector and the term [𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 −  𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 ] is 
the differential replication selection, so that the updating process is payoff monotonic. The third line in 
equation (15) follows from the fact that the average profit rate in each sector is: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ = (𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 ] +
(1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 ]. In terms of growth rates the updating process is simply  𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ . 
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During the gradual adoption of an innovation, each sector will consist of a combination of firms 
producing with the older and newer technologies side by side. Technical change and its evolutionary 
diffusion imply that older and newer cost structures coexist until the newer technique completely replaces 
the older one. Given the investment of monetary capital 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 in each sector, the new quantities supplied 
can be found by dividing the capital invested by the cost structure: 
 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛] + (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑜 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜]
  (16) 
The denominator in equation (16) implies that the cost structure of each sector is a linear 
combination of the firms operating with the new technique and the firms operating with the old technique. 
The endogenous term 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 in this linear combination of cost structures comes from the replicator dynamic 
in equation (15). As firms gradually update to the new technique, the share 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 rises and displaces the 
older productive structure [𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑜 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜] in favor of the newer cost structure [𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛]. The 
supply equation in (16) thus replaces the previous supply equation in (6) which only works with a single 
technology.  
Given the newer cost structure and sector supplies, market prices must be recalculated jointly 
with the total end-of-period expenditures. When the diffusion of the new technology begins to affect 
market prices, it will immediately affect profit rates associated with the old (𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 )  and new (𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 ) 
techniques. As long as 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 > 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜  holds true, firms will keep updating and driving 𝜐𝑖,𝑡  up through the 
replication process. Changes in 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 then have further feedback effects on the quantities produced through 
the supply equations in each sector. New supplies then continue to affect market prices. New market 
prices for both means of production and consumption goods, in turn, will affect firms’ profitability once 
again, which will then trigger further adoption of the newer technique. Once the intra-sector replicator 
equation produces a new value for 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 the system keeps looping until a stationary state is reached for the 
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share of firms using the new technology in each sector. In the limiting case of 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 1, all firms adopt the 
new technology and the old technique vanishes completely.  
The transition from 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 0 towards 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 1 formalizes the mechanism of innovation diffusion 
through the replication of successful strategies. Intra-sector competition for greater profits through cost 
reduction drives the gradual adoption of new technologies that save on input usage. Each single firm 
behaves without coordinating with any other firm. Atomized agents only respond to profitability signals 
and do not, and actually cannot care about aggregate outcomes when deciding upon the adoption of a new 
technique of production. The dynamic interplay between individual actions and aggregate outcomes 
produces a chain of events that escapes from the control of any single entity. 
Average rates of profit in each sector depend on the prevailing market prices and on the linear 
combination between older and newer production techniques: 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ =
𝑝𝑖,𝑡
(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛] + (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑜 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜]
− 1 =  
∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
 (17) 
As soon as average profit rates in each sector (𝑟1,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝑟2,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ) change from their previous position 
they then affect intra-sector competition via the micro replicator dynamic in equation (15) as well as it 
affects inter-sector competition via the macro replicator dynamic in equation (11). Because of profitability 
differentials between sectors, in each period a fraction of the capitalists will flow into the sector with the 
higher average profit rate 𝑟𝑖,𝑡̅̅̅̅ . When capitals flow into a different sector they bring in more investments 
while withdrawing their monetary capitals from the sector with lower profitability. More investment in 
one sector via changes in 𝑓𝑖,𝑡  means additional supply in the sector with capital inflows and lower supply 
in the sector with capital outflows. Inter-sector adjustments in equation (11) then affect intra-sector 
dynamics via equation (15), which then feeds back again into equation (11) and so forth. 
The evolutionary, nonlinear, and complex features of this model appear in the permanent 
interaction among the macro and micro replication dynamics in equations (11) and (15). The out-of-
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equilibrium adjustments and the evolution of the system over time explicitly reflect the interplay of 
unintended social consequences of uncoordinated individual actions. This interplay generates multiple 
long-run equilibria, each with varying properties in terms of asymptotic stability and instability. In the 
next section I analyze the stationary states and the evolutionary strategies that might prevail in the long 
run. 
4. Long-Run Equilibria and Evolutionary Stability  
In an evolutionary setting, differential replication offers a behavioral foundation for spontaneous 
and path-dependent interactions of multiple uncoordinated agents. The replicator dynamic also provides a 
behavioral foundation for the Nash equilibrium by way of the concept of evolutionary stability or 
asymptotic self-correction. Individuals are adaptive agents that are not always forward-looking inter-
temporal maximizers, but are most often bearers of behavioral rules. For this reason, an evolutionary 
model of social dynamics emphasizes not individuals but behavioral rules. What individuals do with their 
local knowledge is then crucial in determining which behavioral rules succeed or perish over time. Hence 
equilibrium is no longer static but instead becomes a temporal concept. Some equilibria, for example, 
might be evolutionarily irrelevant because they do not have evolutionary stability (Bowles, 2006; Gintis, 
2009). 
This evolutionary model has multiple dimensions and is not linear. Its nonlinearity in multiple 
dimensions makes its behavior substantially more complex, at the cost of preventing us from having an 
analytical solution to the evolution of the system. But the model becomes more intuitive if we focus on 
the trajectories of the three replicator equations (𝑓1,𝑡, 𝜐1,𝑡, 𝜐2,𝑡) towards their long-run stationary states. 
Stationary states are those states at which the replicator reaches a fixed point with no further changes in 
the replication process(∆𝑓1,𝑡 = 0, ∆𝜐1,𝑡 = 0, ∆𝜐2,𝑡 = 0). The crucial procedure is to know which strategies 
are going to prevail asymptotically (when 𝑡 → ∞). 
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In an evolutionary game with replicator dynamics we know that the evolutionary stable strategies 
prevail over the long run. An evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a best response to itself and hence it is 
a symmetric Nash equilibrium that is also asymptotically stable in its respective replicator equation. 
Shocks are self-correcting around a steady state that has evolutionary stability. Evolutionary stability 
implies both self-correction and asymptotic attractiveness, hence the system converges over time to a 
stationary point with evolutionary stability. The concept of evolutionary stability is therefore a refinement 
of the concept of Nash equilibrium (Bowles, 2006; Elaydi, 2005; Gintis, 2009). 
In Table 1 I summarize the stationary states and asymptotic properties of each replicator equation. 
The long-run equilibrium for the whole model can be any combination out of the four cases (but with only 
three possible stationary states) from each of the three replicator equations. Because the overall long-run 
equilibrium requires Nash equilibria in every subgame, the long-run equilibrium is also a subgame perfect 
equilibrium. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
For the macro inter-sector dynamic there are four possible cases: (i) Investment in sector I and 
investment in sector II are both ESS so capitalists will allocate all investment to either of these sectors 
depending on the initial conditions, parameters, and the evolution of the system, such that any interior 
solution is unstable; (ii) Investment in sector I is the only ESS hence the system converges to all 
investment being allocated to sector I and none to sector II, which happens because the average profit rate 
in sector I is consistently above the average profit rate in sector II; (iii) Investment in sector II is the only 
ESS so the system converges to all investment being allocated to sector II and none to sector I, which 
happens because the average profit rate in sector II is consistently above the average profit rate in sector I; 
(iv) When there is no ESS the system converges to an interior stable solution in which a share of the 
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investment goes to sector I and the other share goes to sector II, such that average profit rates are 
equalized asymptotically across sectors. In this last case, profit rates are not just equal across sectors but 
truly equalized in the sense that the equality in sector profitability has evolutionary stability and hence is 
self-correcting over the long run. 
For the micro intra-sector dynamic in sector I there are also four possible cases: (i) Adoption and 
non-adoption of the new technique of production are both ESS, hence the sector converges to either full 
adoption or zero adoption depending on the initial conditions, parameters, and the evolution of the 
system, and any interior solution is unstable; (ii) Adoption of the new technique is the only ESS hence the 
sector converges to full adoption, a case in which the profit rate associated with the newer technique is 
systematically greater than the profit rate associated with the older technique; (iii) Non-adoption is the 
only ESS hence no firm will innovate, a case in which the profit rate associated with the newer technique 
is systematically lower than the profit rate associated with the older technique; (iv) There is no ESS and 
hence the sector converges to a stable interior solution with a share of the capitalists adopting the 
innovation while the other share does not innovate, such that the profit rates associated with the older and 
newer techniques equalize over time within sector I. For the micro intra-sector dynamic in sector II there 
are four possible cases and these are analogous to the dynamic in sector I.  
An extra layer of complexity exists in this evolutionary model because the technical coefficients 
in the input-output matrix are exogenous but not constant. Technological progress means that the 
production coefficients can change over time, which implies that a strategy that was an ESS before the 
technical change might not be an ESS after the innovation is introduced. As long as we have exogenous 
innovations brought into the system, the ESSs themselves will change over time. For example, investment 
in sector I might be the only ESS before an innovation is introduced, but after the innovation is introduced 
the new technical coefficients might make investment in sector II become the only ESS. The asymptotic 
properties and the existence of ESSs are therefore sensitive to the changes in the technical coefficients 
that the exogenous innovations generate. 
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When the interior solution in the replicator dynamic is asymptotically stable the system tends to 
converge to it since the fixed points at the edges of the system will be unstable. When the interior solution 
is unstable then the system will tend to converge to the stable solutions at the edges of the system where 
the populations of firms become homogenous. In the macro inter-sector replicator, when the interior 
solution 0 < 𝑓𝑖,𝑡
∗ < 1 such that Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0 is stable, the system will tend to converge to it because the 
solutions 𝑓1,𝑡 = 1 and 𝑓1,𝑡 = 0 such that Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0 at the edges of the system will be unstable. But if the 
interior solution becomes unstable then the system will tend to converge to either edge at 𝑓1,𝑡 = 1 or at 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 0 since these will be the stable stationary states. The same reasoning applies to the micro intra-
sector replicators. When the interior solution 0 < 𝑣𝑖,𝑡
∗ < 1 such that ∆𝜐𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0 is stable then the other 
fixed points 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 0 and 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 1 at the edges are unstable. But if the interior solution is unstable then the 
fixed points 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 0 and 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 1 at the edges are stable.  
Stability requires the payoff of a strategy to increase less than the competing payoff when the 
agents adopting that strategy increase their share in the population. Given the nonlinear and multi-
dimensional properties of the model, the stability analysis of this dynamic system of difference (or 
recurrence) equations would require us: (i) to find every possible fixed point in terms of the exogenous 
parameters; (ii) linearize the system around each fixed point; (iii) compute the Jacobian matrix of partial 
derivatives at every fixed point; (iv) compute the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the Jacobian matrix at 
every fixed point; (v) check whether the absolute value of every eigenvalue lies within the unit circle  
(Scheinerman, 2000; Elaydi, 2005). This mathematical exercise would give us a precise diagnosis of the 
stability of every possible stationary state. Stability analysis must be carried out for every possible fixed 
point under both closures (Say’s law and Keynes’ effective demand), but such procedure is extremely 
cumbersome and little would be gained in terms of economic theory. Fortunately we can have a more 
intuitive understanding of the evolution of the system by simulating the model and observing its behavior 
over time.  
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Which long-run equilibrium will prevail, and whether or not the stationary state will be stable, 
depends on which closure we impose on the system. In the next section I analyze the implications of 
choosing an exogenous rate of exploitation as a first closure, which in fact implies adopting Say’s law. In 
the subsequent section I then analyze an alternative closure for the model that employs Keynes’ principle 
of effective demand and which automatically makes the rate of exploitation dependent upon it.  
5. Say’s Law and the Exogenous Rate of Exploitation  
The first closure that I present for the evolutionary model posits an exogenous rate of 
exploitation. An exogenous rate of exploitation means that the rate of exploitation must be the same both 
in the production sphere and in the circulation sphere, or that there is no difference between the realized 
rate of exploitation and the rate of exploitation in production, which in fact implies the deployment of 
Say’s law. 
When the rate of exploitation is predetermined in the model then all the value (including surplus 
value and profits) produced must be realized in sales, otherwise the rate of exploitation would not be held 
constant throughout the circuit of capital. Since all surplus value must be realized, and given that in the 
circuit of capital the initial investment in labor power and means of production take place at the beginning 
of each period, an exogenous rate of exploitation is equivalent to an exogenous profit-wage ratio and 
hence an exogenous functional distribution of income between wages and profits. In the Marxist circuit of 
capital, since the production of value already presupposes an initial investment in wages and machines, an 
exogenous rate of exploitation predetermines the amount of profits even before they are actually realized, 
and hence it corresponds to an also exogenous distribution of value added between wages and profits. If 
we were to consider realization problems associated with the lack of effective demand, the rate of 
exploitation (or the distribution of income between wages and profits) could not be predetermined 
exogenously at any given level. 
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Once the rate of exploitation (or the distribution of income) is given exogenously, whatever its 
level may be, this exogenous rate of exploitation predetermines the amount of profits to be realized in 
each sector and hence prevents profit rates from equalizing throughout the economy. Under Say’s law, 
under an exogenous rate of exploitation, or under a given distribution of income between wages and 
profits, the economy has no self-correction mechanism that would make profit rates sensitive to the 
amount invested in each sector.  
Profit rate equalization necessitates profit rates to be equal across sectors and also necessitates 
that this equality in profitability be self-correcting and hence to have evolutionary stability. If profit rates 
are equal across sectors but this equality is not stable asymptotically then profit rates have not been 
equalized. Profit rates can indeed be numerically equal across sectors when the rate of exploitation is 
exogenous, but this equality will be transient and not stable asymptotically.  
The long-run market prices that prevail in a competitive economy under profit rate equalization 
across sectors are what Marx called prices of production and Adam Smith called natural prices. These 
prices of production are the prices that have evolutionary stability and therefore are the ones that operate 
as gravitational centers in a competitive environment. Under an exogenous rate of exploitation or under 
Say’s law, profit rates do not equalize in the long run and hence prices of production cannot function as 
gravitational centers for market prices. The idea of a gravitational center in classical Political Economy is 
thus what we now name evolutionary stability or asymptotic self-correction in evolutionary game theory. 
In the lines that follow I develop this reasoning in more detail. 
The 𝑙𝑖  hours worked per unit of output produce the value added that corresponds to the 
summation of the value of labor power and the surplus value, or value added as the summation of wages 
and profits. The value of labor power is simply the wage bill. The paid labor time 𝑤𝑙𝑖 generates a surplus 
value of 𝑒𝑤𝑙𝑖, in which 𝑒 indicates the rate of exploitation or the ratio of the surplus to the value of labor 
power. Workers in sector 𝑖 produce 𝑤𝑙𝑖(1 + 𝑒) of value added per unit of output but only get back the 
value of their labor power corresponding to 𝑤𝑙𝑖, thus leaving the surplus or unpaid labor time 𝑒𝑤𝑙𝑖 to the 
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capitalists hiring them. Workers get their money wages and spend it as they like, not bound to any real 
wage specified in terms of a bundle of goods. 
In this closure of the model I suppose the rate of exploitation 𝑒 to be exogenous and equal for 
every firm in either sector. For 𝑒 to be predetermined we must impose Say’s law so that all value and 
surplus value produced are realized. Total sales in each sector (𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ ) correspond to the monetary capital 
realized and hence comprise the summation of the constant and variable capitals invested plus all of the 
surplus value generated in the production phase. Profits in each sector (∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡) originate from the share of 
unpaid labor time (𝑒 𝑤𝑙𝑖 𝑥𝑖,𝑡). Hence: 
 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ = [𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖(1 + 𝑒)]𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑒 𝑤𝑙𝑖  𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
(20) 
(21) 
In qualitative terms, profits originate from surplus value. Under Say’s law, the causality in 
quantitative terms then runs from exploitation to profits (𝑒 → ∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡). Profits originate qualitatively from 
surplus value, and under Say’s law the quantity of surplus value produced determines the amount of 
surplus value realized and hence determines the amount of profits in the system. This particular relation 
between profitability and exploitation derives from the fact that the price system is such that 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 =
 𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1i + 𝑤𝑙𝑖 + 𝑒𝑤𝑙𝑖 = [𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1i + 𝑤𝑙𝑖](1 +  𝑟𝑖,𝑡). Rearranging terms and solving for the profit rate 
gives us that: 
 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑒
1 + (
𝑝1,𝑡−1
𝑤 ) (
𝑎1𝑖
𝑙𝑖
)
 
(22) 
Equation (22) is the usual Marxist relation in which the profit rate is the rate of exploitation 
divided by one plus the organic composition of capital. The organic composition is, in turn, the relative 
price (
𝑝1,𝑡−1
𝑤
)  times the technical composition (
𝑎1𝑖
𝑙𝑖
)  between constant and variable capital. When 𝑒  is 
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predetermined, the long-run 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 will also be predetermined in both sectors I and II. The exogenous rate of 
exploitation predetermines profitability because in equation (22) we have that 𝑒, 𝑤, 𝑎1𝑖 , and 𝑙𝑖  are all 
parameters and Say’s law in sector I also predetermines the path of 𝑝1,𝑡: because 0 ≤ 𝑎11 < 1, there is a 
stationary state such that 𝑝1,𝑡 →
𝑤𝑙1(1+𝑒)
1−𝑎11
 as 𝑡 → ∞. However, even though market prices converge to a 
stationary state, this stationary state is not a price of production as profit rates are not equalized across 
sectors! 
The wage share in value added is 
𝑉
𝑉+𝑆
=
1
1+𝑒
 , where V is the value of labor power (wage bill), S 
is surplus value or profits, and hence V+S is the flow of value added in the economy. Given that in the 
circuit of capital the expenditure with wages (or V) happens at the start of the circuit, as in equation (1), 
when the rate of exploitation (e) is exogenous it will automatically predetermine the wage and profit 
shares of national income. The functional distribution of income becomes exogenous and thus 
unresponsive to capital accumulation. 
Once firms begin to adopt technological innovations, the productive structure in each sector 
becomes a linear combination of the firms using the older and newer technologies side by side. The 
recalculation of profitability then requires weighting the surplus value produced by the respective shares 
of firms employing the newer and older techniques. Equations (23) and (24) below replace equations (20) 
and (21) as soon as a new technique is introduced: 
 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ = {(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛(1 + 𝑒)] + (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑜 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜(1 + 𝑒)]}𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = {(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛𝑒] + (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜𝑒]}𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
(23) 
(24) 
For a given rate of exploitation, increments in the share of firms adopting the new technology 
(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)  might reduce the average profit rate prevailing in the sector if the new technology employs 
relatively less labor power. I stress the conditional clause ‘might’ since the final effect on profitability can 
only be known after the repricing of both the means of production and the final consumption good. 
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A full analytical solution to this system is too cumbersome and not illuminating enough to be 
worthwhile, but simulations are feasible and useful and provide some intuitive sense of how the system 
works. To simulate the model in its first closure it is necessary to fix eleven parameters and three initial 
conditions. The initial technical coefficients are set to (𝑎11
𝑜 , 𝑎12
𝑜 , 𝑙1
𝑜, 𝑙2
𝑜) = (0.2, 0.1, 0.7, 0.7) for the old 
technology. The nominal wage 𝑤 is set to 10 dollars per work hour, the rate of exploitation 𝑒 is set to 
110%, and only 𝜇 =20% of the firms migrate to another sector according to inter-sector average 
profitability differentials. The initial aggregate monetary capital 𝑀𝑡=1 is set to 100 dollars, and is initially 
distributed as 60% to the sector manufacturing means of production (𝑓1,𝑡=1 = 0.6) and 40% to the sector 
producing the final consumption good (𝑓2,𝑡=1 = 0.4). The market price for the means of production 
produced in sector I starts from 50 dollars per unit (𝑝1,𝑡=0 = 50). 
The model is set to run for 400 periods. For the first 49 rounds the trajectories evolve without any 
kind of innovation or technical change. At period t=50 I introduce an innovation in sector II that increases 
labor productivity by 100% while increasing the use of machines by 100% per unit of output such that 
productivity gains are 𝜂𝑎12 = −50% and 𝜂l2 = 100% and hence (𝑎11
𝑜 , 𝑎12
𝑛 , 𝑙1
𝑜, 𝑙2
𝑛) = (0.2, 0.2, 0.7, 0.35). 
This machine-intensive labor-saving innovation generates a strong increase in the technical composition 
of capital in the sector producing the consumption good. At time t=100 I introduce an innovation in sector 
I that increases labor productivity by 150% and the use of the machines by 100% per unit of output such 
that productivity gains are 𝜂𝑎11 = −50% and 𝜂l1 = 150% and hence (𝑎11
𝑛 , 𝑎12
𝑛 , 𝑙1
𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑛) = (0.4, 0.2, 0.28, 
0.35). This innovation also implies a strong machine-intensive labor-saving technical change in the sector 
producing the means of production.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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In Figure 1 I report the evolution of key variables from the first closure of the model with Say’s 
law and an exogenous rate of exploitation. The uncoordinated implementation of the new technologies 
increases the profit rate only for those firms initially adopting the innovation, but the gradual diffusion of 
the new production technologies results in lower levels of profitability for all capitalists over time. The 
uncoordinated struggle for greater individual profits via technical change can indeed lead to a reduction in 
the average profitability for all competitors over time. As expected, even though the real wage is 
determined endogenously, the exogenous rate of exploitation predetermines constant profit and wage 
shares of value added. 
Profit rates do not equalize under Say’s law, even though they are temporarily equal across 
sectors for two specific moments in time during the implementation of the new techniques of production. 
With an exogenous rate of exploitation the model has no self-correction mechanism to equalize profit 
rates over the long run. This happens because the exogenous rate of exploitation turns the macro 
replicator dynamic unresponsive to the amount invested in each sector.  
Say’s law implies that the interior solution 𝑓1,𝑡
∗  in the macro replicator dynamic is asymptotically 
unstable. When the model is closed with Say’s law, the exogenous and therefore predetermined rate of 
exploitation makes profit rates in each sector insensitive to changes in 𝑓1,𝑡. Thus the interior solution 𝑓1,𝑡
∗ , 
under which profit rates equalize across sectors, will not have evolutionary stability. Because 𝑓1,𝑡
∗  does not 
have evolutionary stability, production prices do not exist and hence cannot function as gravitational 
centers for market prices. In this case 𝑓1,𝑡  will tend to move to the stable stationary points at either 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 0 or 𝑓1,𝑡 = 1. Asymptotically the total monetary capital under Say’s law is invested either 100% in 
sector I or 100% in sector II, depending on which sector has the permanently higher average profit rate.  
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6. Effective Demand and the Endogenous Rate of Exploitation  
In this section I offer a second closure for the evolutionary model in which the rate of exploitation 
is endogenous and dependent on the level of effective demand. Under Keynes’ principle of effective 
demand the rate of exploitation necessarily becomes endogenous to aggregate expenditures and is thus no 
longer solely determined in the production sphere. Once effective demand is brought into the model, the 
rate of exploitation, and thus the distribution of income between wages and profits automatically become 
dependent on the level of aggregate expenditures. We can either have an exogenous rate of exploitation or 
the principle of effective demand at play, but not both simultaneously. 
The principle of effective demand implies that value originates in the production phase but is only 
validated in circulation via consumption and investment expenditures. Expenditures determine incomes. 
And because surplus value is a type of income, both the amount of surplus value realized and the level of 
exploitation can only be known after the end-of-period consumption and investment expenditures have 
been carried out. Marx himself was well aware of the role of effective demand in the realization of value. 
For example: 
 “The general possibility of crisis is given in the process of metamorphosis of capital itself, and in 
two ways: in so far as money functions as means of circulation, [the possibility of crisis lies in] 
the separation of purchase and sale; and in so far as money functions as means of payment, it has 
two different aspects, it acts as measure of value and as realisation of value.  These two aspects 
[may] become separated.  If in the interval between them the value has changed, if the commodity 
at the moment of its sale is not worth what it was worth at the moment when money was acting as 
a measure of value and therefore as a measure of the reciprocal obligations, then the obligation 
cannot be met from the proceeds of the sale of the commodity, and therefore the whole series of 
transactions which retrogressively depend on this one transaction, cannot be settled.” (Marx, 
1861-1863, Theories of Surplus Value, volume II, chapter 17, section 11). 
 
When effective demand determines the amount of surplus value realized and hence the level of 
exploitation, sector profitability becomes sensitive to the amount of investment expenditures in each 
sector. An endogenous rate of exploitation that is dependent upon effective demand confers evolutionary 
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stability to the equalization of profitability, and therefore allows for prices of production to operate as 
gravitational centers for market prices. Profit rates equalize over the long run as long as sector 
profitability responds negatively to the amount invested in each sector, such that short-run deviations are 
self-correcting in the long run.  
Supposing that workers do not save and that there is no consumption credit, the total demand for 
the consumption good produced in sector II (denoted by 𝑀2,𝑡
′ ) is simply the total wage bill in the 
economy. Given that the wage bills in each sector must be weighted by the shares of firms using the old 
and the new technologies, we have that the total wage bill and hence total consumption expenditures are: 
 
𝑀2,𝑡
′ = {(𝜐1,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙1
𝑛] + (1 − 𝜐1,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙1
0]} 𝑥1,𝑡 + 
{(𝜐2,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙2
𝑛] + (1 − 𝜐2,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙2
0]} 𝑥2,𝑡 
(25) 
The investment function is surely the more sensitive part of the model. In this closure I opt for the 
neo-Keynesian investment function à la Joan Robinson (1962; see also Dutt, 2011 and 1990; Marglin, 
1984). It assumes that firms operate at full capacity utilization and that the desired amount of investment 
is a function of the observed profit rate. Given that there are firms operating with the newer and older 
technologies simultaneously in each sector, the aggregate demand for the means of production produced 
in sector 1 (denoted by 𝑀1,𝑡
′ ) is: 
 
           𝑀1,𝑡
′ = 𝑀1,𝑡−1
′ + 𝛾1{(𝜐1,𝑡)[𝑟1,𝑡−1
𝑛 ] + (1 − 𝜐1,𝑡)[𝑟1,𝑡−1
0 ]} 𝑀1,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛾2{(𝜐2,𝑡)[𝑟2,𝑡−1
𝑛 ] + (1 − 𝜐2,𝑡)[𝑟2,𝑡−1
0 ]} 𝑀2,𝑡−1 
(26) 
The parameters 𝛾𝑖 indicate the sensitivity of investment expenditures to the observed profit rates 
in each sector, and the autonomous component of investment expenditures is simply the investment 
carried out in the previous period (𝑀1,𝑡−1
′ ) . The end-of-period expenditures with consumption and 
investment then connect the circuit of capital in period 𝑡 with the circuit in period 𝑡 + 1. Aggregate 
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demand at the end of period 𝑡 is 𝑀𝑡
′ = 𝑀1,𝑡
′ + 𝑀2,𝑡
′ , which is identical to the aggregate monetary capital at 
the beginning of period 𝑡 + 1, such that 𝑀𝑡+1 = 𝑀𝑡
′ with causality running from 𝑀𝑡+1 to 𝑀𝑡
′. 
The endogenous rates of exploitation within each sector (denoted by 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) are the sector surplus 
value realized over the nominal wage bill: 
 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
{(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛] + (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙𝑖
0]} 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
 
(27) 
In equation (27) we can observe that the rates of exploitation 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 in each sector depend directly 
on the level of effective demand 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′  from equations (25) and (26). As under Say’s law, in qualitative 
terms profits originate from surplus value. But contrary to Say’s law, under which in quantitative terms 
the causality runs from exploitation to profits (𝑒 → ∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡), the principle of effective demand implies that 
in quantitative terms the causality now runs from profits to exploitation (𝑒 ← ∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡). Even though profits 
originate qualitatively from surplus value, under Keynes’ principle of effective demand the amount of 
profit determines the quantity of surplus value realized. 
This evolutionary model is nonlinear, has no closed form solution, and cannot be solved 
analytically. A way to circumvent this analytical shortcoming is to simulate the model numerically many 
times over and check under which parameter values and initial conditions the equilibrium with equalized 
profit rates is either evolutionarily stable or unstable. Simulations indicate that initial conditions have 
solely negligible temporary effects over the first time periods. But the input-output coefficients and the 
sensitivity of investment to changes in profit rates do have large and long-lasting effects on the dynamics 
of the system. The result obtained from several rounds of simulations is that as long as the economy is 
viable, such that it does not collapse because of permanently negative profit rates, the system features a 
long-run equilibrium with equalized profit rates as an evolutionary stable stationary state. 
I simulate the model in its second closure to illustrate these points. To facilitate comparison with 
the model in its first closure I keep the same parameter values and innovation patterns as in the previous 
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simulation. For the investment function I set 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0.5, and investment demand begins at 50 dollars 
(𝑀1,𝑡=1
′ = 50) as an initial condition. Simulation results for key variables are reported in Figure 2. 
Similarly to the first simulation, all firms in both sectors adopt the new technologies over the long run 
(such that 𝜐1,𝑡 → 1 and 𝜐2,𝑡 → 1 when 𝑡 →  ∞). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Contrary to Say’s law, Keynes’ principle of effective demand makes profit rate equalization an 
evolutionary stable long-run equilibrium. Unlike the model in its first closure under an exogenous rate of 
exploitation, when the macro inter-sector replicator had an unstable interior solution that forced the 
system to move to its edges in the long run, the macro inter-sector replicator under effective demand now 
reaches an interior stationary state 𝑓1,𝑡
∗  with equalized profitability that is stable asymptotically.  
With the explicit incorporation of effective demand, profit rates do equalize and this equality has 
evolutionary stability, thus prices of production can operate as gravitational centers for market prices. 
Unlike the first closure under Say’s law, and because the rates of exploitation in each sector are now 
endogenous, the functional distribution of income between wages and profits is no longer predetermined. 
The level of exploitation, the real wage, as well as the wage and profit shares of value added now all 
respond to the trajectory of aggregate expenditures. 
Under Keynes’ principle of effective demand the economy-wide average profit rate functions as a 
gravitational center for the sector average profit rates, hence any short-run deviations from the economy-
wide average are soon self-corrected. With the introduction of effective demand the system displays 
negative feedback effects that make profitability equalization self-correcting, so that the total monetary 
capital in the economy will not all flow into a single sector over the long run. Unlike the first closure 
when all investment did migrate to a single sector, the macro inter-sector replicator dynamic now reaches 
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an interior stationary state that is stable asymptotically and in which a fraction of the total monetary 
capital flows to sector 1 and the other fraction to sector 2.  
7. Conclusion and Implications 
In this paper I have claimed and demonstrated the following points regarding the Marxist theory 
of exploitation and accumulation. First, an exogenous rate of exploitation implies Say’s law since under 
an exogenous rate of exploitation the volume of profits is predetermined even before it is realized in the 
market. Because the rate of exploitation is equivalent to the profit-wage ratio, an exogenous rate of 
exploitation implies an exogenous functional distribution of income between wages and profits. An 
exogenous distribution of income between wages and profits thus also implies Say’s law. Second, an 
exogenous rate of exploitation, or equivalently an exogenous functional distribution of income, prevents 
profit rates from equalizing across sectors. Third, Marx himself was logically inconsistent in Capital III 
when supposing an exogenous rate of exploitation together with equalizing profit rates. Fourth, because 
profit rates cannot equalize, an exogenous rate of exploitation or Say’s law prevent prices of production 
from operating as gravitational centers to market prices. Fifth, once Keynes’ principle of effective 
demand is introduced, the rate of exploitation and the wage and profit shares become endogenous and 
dependent on the level of aggregate expenditures. Sixth, when the rate of exploitation is dependent on 
effective demand, profit rates will equalize across sectors and hence prices of production can operate as 
gravitational centers for market prices. Seventh, the idea of a gravitational center in classical Political 
Economy is what we now name a stationary state with evolutionary stability (or asymptotic self-
correction) in evolutionary game theory. Eighth, profit rate equalization requires profit rates to be equal 
and this equality to have evolutionary stability, such that short-run deviations from equilibrium are self-
corrected over time. 
The main implication of these results is that we can either have: (a) an exogenous rate of 
exploitation, an exogenous profit-wage ratio, an exogenous functional distribution of income between 
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wages and profits, Say’s law, non-equalizing profit rates, and no prices of production as gravitational 
centers for market prices; or (b) an endogenous rate of exploitation, an endogenous profit-wage ratio, an 
endogenous functional distribution of income between wages and profits, Keynes’ principle of effective 
demand, equalizing profit rates across sectors, and prices of production as gravitational centers for market 
prices.  
If we aim at developing a theory that is both empirically relevant and logically consistent, Marxist 
scholars must therefore drop Say’s law and incorporate Keynes’ principle of effective demand for a 
proper understanding of how capital accumulation determines the rate of exploitation, the functional 
distribution of income, and the equalization of profit rates. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Stationary States and Asymptotic Properties of the Model 
                                              Stationary States 
(a) Macro Inter-Sector Replicator 
Investment in sector I is ESS 
Investment in sector II is ESS 
Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟1,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ≷ 𝑟2,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  
𝑓1,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
0 < 𝑓𝑖,𝑡
∗ < 1  is unstable 
Investment in sector I is ESS 
Investment in sector II is not ESS 
Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟1,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ > 𝑟2,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  
𝑓1,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
Investment in sector I is not ESS 
Investment in sector II is ESS 
Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟1,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ < 𝑟2,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  
𝑓1,𝑡 = 1  is unstable 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
No ESS Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟1,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑟2,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  
0 < 𝑓𝑖,𝑡
∗ < 1  is stable 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 1  is unstable 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
(b) Micro Intra-Sector Replicator in Sector I 
Innovate is ESS 
Not innovate is ESS 
∆𝜐1,𝑡+1 = 0 
 
𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 ≷ 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑜  
 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
0 < 𝑣1,𝑡
∗ < 1  is unstable 
Innovate is ESS 
Not innovate is not ESS 
∆𝜐1,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 > 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑜  
𝜐1,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
Innovate is not ESS 
Not innovate is ESS 
∆𝜐1,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 < 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑜  
𝜐1,𝑡 = 1  is unstable 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
No ESS ∆𝜐1,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 = 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑜  
0 < 𝑣1,𝑡
∗ < 1  is stable 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 1  is unstable 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
(c) Micro Intra-Sector Replicator in Sector II 
Innovate is ESS 
Not innovate is ESS 
∆𝜐2,𝑡+1 = 0 
 
𝑟2,𝑡
𝑛 ≷ 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑜  
 
𝜐2,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝜐2,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
0 < 𝑣2,𝑡
∗ < 1  is unstable 
Innovate is ESS 
Not innovate is not ESS 
∆𝜐2,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑛 > 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑜  
𝜐2,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝜐2,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
Innovate is not ESS 
Not innovate is ESS 
∆𝜐2,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑛 < 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑜  
𝜐2,𝑡 = 1  is unstable 
𝜐2,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
No ESS ∆𝜐2,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑛 = 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑜  
0 < 𝑣2,𝑡
∗ < 1  is stable 
𝜐2,𝑡 = 1   is unstable 
 𝜐1,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
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Figure 1: Simulation of the Evolutionary Model with Say’s Law  
and an Exogenous Rate of Exploitation 
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Figure 2: Simulation of the Evolutionary Model with Effective Demand  
and Endogenous Rates of Exploitation 
  
  
  
  
  
 
